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This paper provides a new way of analyzing tenure profiles in wages, by modelling 
simultaneously the evolution of wages and the distribution of tenures. We develop a 
theoretical model based on efficient bargaining, where both log outside wage and log wage in 
the current job follow a random walk, as found empirically. This setting allows the 
application of real option theory. We derive the efficient separation rule. The model fits the 
observed distribution of job tenures well. Since we observe outside wages only at job start and 
job separation, our empirical analysis of within job wage growth is based on expected wage 
growth conditional on the outside wages at both dates. Our modelling allows testing of the 
efficient bargaining hypothesis. The model is estimated on the PSID. 
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A large empirical literature has looked at wage returns to job seniority using a
whole arsenal of econometric techniques, see Farber (1999) for a survey. The
conclusions of this research still diverge, despite analyzing data from the same
countries (mainly the USA) or even the same longitudinal datasets (mostly
the PSID): while some authors ﬁnd that large estimated returns are spurious
and wage returns to tenure are actually very small, e.g. Altonji and Shakotko
(1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Williams (1997, 2005), Abowd
et al (1999), others conﬁrm large and signiﬁcant wage returns close to cross-
section estimates, e.g. Topel (1991), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Buchinsky
et al (2005). Here we provide a new direction for investigating the wage-tenure
relationship. From a theoretical point of view, large "true" returns to tenure
are problematic. Were there really large returns, the worker-ﬁrm match would
spoil large gains from trade at the moment of separation. Why would a worker
separate when he loses his tenure proﬁle by doing so? Hence, separation is likely
to be induced by the ﬁrm, what we call a layoﬀ. But why would the worker and
the ﬁrm not renegotiate the wage instead of separating? Although some models,
such as eﬃciency wage models, can explain why this renegotiation process might
not be fully eﬃcient, the size of the wage returns to seniority reported in some
papers remains puzzling. In fact, the empirical evidence oﬀers support for at
least some form of renegotiation. For instance Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan
(1993) have shown that displaced workers face severe wage cuts of up to 25% just
before separation. This paper addresses explicitly whether the existing evidence
is consistent with eﬃcient separations by modelling simultaneously the evolution
of wages and the distribution of job tenures.
We take eﬃcient bargaining as benchmark. Hence, quits and job layoﬀsa r e
observationally equivalent, as in McLaughlin (1991). The model explains the
observed correlation between wages and job tenure from the random evolution
of wages after job start. This random evolution of wages is due to the random
evolution of both the job’s productivity and the outside option. Separation
occurs when the value of productivity in the job falls below the value of the
outside option, which depends on the initial productivity at the job start in the
best alternative job. We refer to this initial productivity in the best alterna-
tive as the outside productivity and the productivity in the job as the inside
productivity. The observed correlation between wages and tenure is caused by
the fact that only jobs that evolve favorably relative to the outside productivity
survive. Hence, there is no such thing as "the" return to tenure in this model.
In some jobs wages go up because the job’s productivity value evolves favorably.
In others wages go down for mutatis mutandis t h es a m er e a s o n .H o w e v e r ,t h e
latter group is gradually eliminated from the stock of ongoing employment re-
lations just because there are no options for mutually gainful renegotiation left
and hence separation becomes eﬃcient.
The evolution of an individual’s within-job log wage is reasonably described
by a random walk with transitory shocks, as previously found by Abowd and
Card (1989), Topel (1991) and Topel and Ward (1992), hypothesis that we
2verify on our PSID estimation sample. Whereas this observation received little
attention among labor economists, we take it as cornerstone of our modelling.
Both log in- and outside productivity are assumed to follow a random walk. Our
model implies that log wages are a linear combination of both, which implies
that log wages in the job follow a random walk as well. Hence, the diﬀerence
in the drift between the log wage in the job and the log outside productivity is
what we traditionally call "the return to tenure".
Each job requires some form of speciﬁc investment. That speciﬁcity can be
anything. Training is just one aspect. For most jobs other aspects are more
important, such as getting to know your new colleagues, knowing where to
make photocopies or where to get a cup of coﬀee, organizing your home-to-work
travel eﬃciently, etc. Upon separation the worker and the ﬁrm lose the value
of these speciﬁc investments. Since separation is irreversible, the investments
have an option value. The combination of irreversible speciﬁc investment and
productivity and outside productivitys following a random walk implies that we
can apply the theory of real options, see for example Dixit (1989), Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Option theory allows us
to calculate the reservation value of productivity for which separation becomes
the eﬃcient alternative. Teulings and van der Ende (2000) use this model for
the analysis of distribution of job tenures. The predicted hazard rates of this
model are well in line with the empirical distribution of the job exits. Our
model shares some features with Mortensen’s (1988) dual "on-the-job-training
and matching" model, starting from the same basic idea of jointly modelling op-
timal separation behavior and individual wage evolution over time and providing
qualitatively similar empirical implications for the job tenure distribution. One
of the essential diﬀerences is the fact that our "match quality" (surplus of the
job’s productivity over the worker’s outside option) evolves randomly and the
intensity of the shocks to the match quality does not diminish with time as in
a Bayesian learning framework.
From the distribution of job tenures we are able to estimate the surplus of the
job’s productivity above its reservation value and a (linear) drift of this surplus,
up to a normalizing constant (the variance of the random walk). We obtain
a positive drift surplus, indicating that some 10% of all jobs will end only by
retirement. We use these parameters to compute the expected surplus in both
completed and incomplete job spells, which will enable us to estimate the evo-
lution of wages. The typical problem in this literature is that the researcher
observes the outside productivity only at job start and at job separation, if
the worker starts a new job immediately afterwards. At job start, the worker
chooses the best alternative that is available at that moment, which is by def-
inition equal to the outside productivity. Hence, the initial wage in this job is
a linear function of the value of the outside productivity at jobstart. Applying
t h es a m er e a s o n i n g ,t h eﬁrst wage at the next job is a function of the outside
productivity at the moment of separation from the previous job. Our estimation
procedure exploits both pieces of information on the outside productivity to the
maximum. To that end, we elaborate an idea ﬁrst explored by Abraham and
Farber (1987): we condition the expected wage growth within a job not only on
3the elapsed duration since job start -that is: current job tenure- but also on the
remaining time span left till the next separation, so we take into account the
complete duration of the job. We can calculate a closed form expression for this
expectation. As a ﬁrst result, we show that this expression does not depend on
the drift surplus. This implies that the evolution of wages in completed spells
is uninformative on the return to tenure. This is a remarkable conclusion given
t h ef a c tt h a ts om a n yp a p e r sh a v et r i e dt oi d e n t i f yt h er e t u r nt ot e n u r ef r o m
this type of data. The only sources of information on the return to tenure are
the distribution of completed tenures and the evolution of wages in incomplete
job spells. The fat right tail in the tenure distribution, with many jobs never
ending, is an indication of large returns to tenure: the return to tenure is so
high that separation is rarely eﬃcient, except for cases where the random walk
evolves really unfavorably.
As a second result, we demonstrate the fragility of the tenure proﬁle identiﬁ-
cation. The problem is not so much the selectivity in the observed wage proﬁle,
as the selectivity in the outside productivity. Observed outside productivities
are positively selected, since we observe them only at the moment when workers
switch jobs and workers switch jobs only when the outside productivity is high.
This source of selectivity usually receives less attention than the selectivity in
t h ei n s i d ew a g e .W es h o wt h a tt h i se ﬀect can be identiﬁed from the wage change
for job movers, but that this is a thin line of identiﬁcation. Surprisingly, selec-
tivity in the outside wage turns out to be an empirically important phenomenon;
this selectivity provides a new source of a "tenure proﬁle", accounting for about
85% o ft h et e n u r ep r o ﬁle we estimate.
The empirical results show that our model does very well in explaining the
concavity in the "observed" tenure proﬁle. Since the "true" tenure proﬁle, the
drift in the diﬀerence between inside and outside productivity, is linear by as-
sumption, this concavity is fully due to selection. One could argue that our
identiﬁcation procedure relies heavily on functional form assumptions. Nev-
ertheless, there is one strong test of our assumptions: the estimated variance
of the innovation in wages is consistent with the concavity in the "observed"
tenure proﬁle. There is nothing in our estimation procedure that drives this
result. Furthermore, we do observe a smaller wage increase during the ﬁrst half
of the job spell than at similar tenures for jobs that separate later or not at all,
as predicted by the model. However, we do not observe wages falling during
the second half of the job spell, as also predicted by the model. This ﬁts the
idea of downward rigidity, as discussed for example by Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991), who ﬁnd that within a job spell wages go up in the upturn, but do not
go down in the downturn. Nonetheless, at the moment of separation, the gap
is ﬁlled by an additional wage decline for job changers. Hence, our empirical
results provide support for an amended version of the model, where we allow for
downward rigidity in wages. This rigidity does not ﬁtt h ee ﬃcient bargaining
hypothesis. In unionized jobs, the fall in wages at the date of separation is
much larger. It is hard to see how these results can be squared with the eﬃcient
bargaining hypothesis. The estimated tenure proﬁle is on the high end of the
spectrum, 5% per year, though more than ﬁve sixths of the return take the form
4of a declining outside productivity instead of a rising inside productivity. If we
were to exclude this part of the proﬁle, our estimates would be on the low end
of the spectrum, 0.6% per year.
W h i l ew ef o c u so nﬁrm tenure, our model could equally well be applied to
industry or occupation tenure, as suggested by Neal (1995). Many speciﬁc skills
are likely to be industry- or occupation-speciﬁc and are thus irreversibly lost if
the worker quits the industry or the occupation, but not if she switches from the
one to the other ﬁrm. One would expect greater losses when switching between
industries or occupations then when just changing jobs, as is reported by Neal
(1995). We leave this extension for future research.
The paper is structured as follows: the model is discussed in Section 2, the
empirical analysis in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Random Productivity Growth Model
2.1 Model Assumptions
Our modelling extends the analysis on the tenure distribution by Teulings and
van der Ende (2002) to wages. Consider a labor market in continuous time,
where a job is a unique match between a risk neutral worker and a risk neutral
ﬁrm. The risk neutrality of both players implies that there is no insurance prob-
lem. We ignore any disutility of eﬀort, so that the worker’s utility depends only
on her income. There is no search cost involved from either party in ﬁnding the
optimal match. A worker picks therefore that vacancy that yields the highest
expected net discounted value. At the start of the job, speciﬁc investments are
made, which are irreversibly lost upon a separation between the worker and
the ﬁrm. However, the ﬁrm retains the property right on the vacancy. That
is, it can hire at any future time, provided that the new worker and the ﬁrm
are prepared to pay the cost of the speciﬁc investment again. These speciﬁci n -
vestments are veriﬁable, so that there are no hold-up problems: the worker and
the ﬁrm can always agree on a side payment at the start of their relation that
oﬀsets expected unbalances in bargaining power. We shall relax this assumption
later on, when discussing the impact of unions. Furthermore, the investments
are made instantaneously and do not require any time for implementation. The
log productivity of the job and the log outside wage evolve over time according
to a random walk. Both worker and ﬁrm are perfectly informed about their
current value, but their future evolution is unknown. The worker and the ﬁrm
bargain over the surplus of the inside productivity over its reservation value.
This bargaining is eﬃcient: as long as there is a surplus, the worker and the
ﬁrm will agree on a sharing rule. At some moment the productivity has fallen
below its reservation value so that separation becomes the eﬃcient alternative.
Then, separation occurs at mutual consent since there are no gains from trade
left. Turnover is therefore eﬃcient, and quits and layoﬀs are observationally
identical, as in McLaughlin (1991). For the sake of convenience, we shall refer
t os e p a r a t i o n sa st h eﬁrm ﬁring the worker in the rest of the paper, though
5separations can be both quits or layoﬀs. Given these assumptions (risk neutral-
ity, no hold up problems, and eﬃcient bargaining), wage setting and separation
decisions can be analyzed separately, since matching and separation decisions
maximize the joint surplus, regardless of its precise distribution. This section
focuses on the separation decision, wage setting being discussed in the next
section.
We assume that job’s productivity Pt follows a geometric Brownian with
drift. The outside productivity Rt is also a geometric Brownian with drift.
This outside productivity Rt is the initial productivity in the best job available
at time t. Since individuals can costlessly pick this best alternative, Pt = Rt at
the moment of job start. The speciﬁc investments at the moment of job start
are proportional to the reservation wage: RtI. One can think of I as cost of
investment measured in units of labor time and of Rt as the price of one unit.
Using lower cases to denote the logs of the corresponding upper cases, the law
























Let J (pt,r t) and V (pt,r t) be the value of a job and a vacancy respectively,
both as functions of log in- and outside productivity, pt and rt. The Bellman
equations for both value functions read (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) :


















where we leave out the arguments of J (·) and V (·) for convenience and where
ρ denotes the interest rate. The ﬁrst term in the expression for J is the current
output of the job, the other terms capture the wealth eﬀects due to changes in
the state variables pt and rt;t h eﬁrst order derivatives capture the eﬀect of the
drift in both state variables, the second order derivatives capture the eﬀect of
their variance. The value matching and smooth pasting conditions read:
J (rS,r S)=V (rS,r S)+e x p( rS)I (3)
V (pT,r T)=J (pT,r T) − V (rT,r T)
Jp (rS,r S)=Vp (rS,r S)
Jr (rS,r S)=Vr (rS,r S)+e x p ( rS)I
Vp (pT,r T)=Jp (pT,r T) − Vp(rT,r T)
Vr (pT,r T)=Jr (pT,r T) − Vr (rT,r T)
6where S is the moment of job start and T is the moment of separation. The ﬁrst
condition states that at the moment of job start (when by deﬁnition, pS = rS),
the value of a ﬁlled job must be equal to the value of the vacancy plus the cost
of speciﬁc investment. The second condition states that at the moment of job
separation, the value of a vacancy in the current job is equal to the value of the
current job minus the value of the vacancy to which the worker is moving; the
latter term reﬂects the fact that by leaving his current job, the worker becomes
available for ﬁlling another job. The last four conditions are the smooth pasting
conditions. These conditions and the Bellman equations (2) jointly determine
J (·) and V (·).





Since Pt and Rt follow a geometric Brownian, Bt also follows a geometric
Brownian:
bt − bs ∼ N
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µ ≡ µp − µr
where again bt denotes logBt.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , BS =1 , bt = pt − rt,a n d
bS =0 . Our claim is that the value functions J (·) and V (·) can be written as:
J (pt,r t)=e x p ( rt)j (pt − rt) (5)
V (pt,r t)=e x p ( rt)v(pt − rt)
where j (·) and v (·) satisfy:
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where we leave out the argument of j (·) and v (·) for convenience. The factor
ρ − µr − 1
2σ2
r is a modiﬁed discount rate, that accounts for the fact that future
revenues are discounted at a rate ρ, but increase in expectation at a rate µr+ 1
2σ2
r
due to the drift in Rt. The value matching and smooth pasting conditions at
the moment of job start and job separation read:
j (0) = v(0) + I
v(bT)=j (bT) − v(0)
j0(0) = v0(0)
v0(bT)=j0(bT) − v0(0)
7w h e r ew eu s ebS =0 . The proof of this claim is by straightforward substitution
of equation (5) in the Bellman equations (2) and the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions (3).1
The hiring and separation rule depend therefore purely on bt:a v a c a n c y
should be ﬁlled at the ﬁrst time S that bt rises up to bh =0 ,aw o r k e ra n da
ﬁrm should separate the worker at the ﬁrst time T that bt falls below bs.O n e
can prove: bs < 0.T h ev a l u eo fbh and bs can be expressed as a function of the
model’s parameters I,µ,Σ and the interest rate ρ, using the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions above, as described in detail by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). Since we do not need these expressions for the subsequent analysis, we
do not present them here, see Teulings and Van der Ende (2000) for those.
2.2 Job Tenure Distribution
Without loss of generality we normalize the moment of job start to zero, S =0 ,
in what follows. Hence, b0 = bh =0 .F r o mt h a tm o m e n to n ,bt evolves according
to its law of motion speciﬁed in equation (4). The separation occurs at the ﬁrst
moment t = T when bt = bs. Hence, T is the completed tenure of that job spell.
Analogously to the probit model, where the variance of the error term is non-
identiﬁed and can therefore be normalized to unity without loss of generality, σ,
the standard deviation of bt, is unidentiﬁed in this model. Hence, we normalize











Hence, Ωt is a Brownian with drift π and unit variance per unit time, with
Ω0 = Ω and ΩT =0 ,w h e r eT is a stochastic variable determined by the evolution
of bt. Ωt is the surplus of the inside productivity pt above its reservation value
at which separation becomes eﬃcient, relative to outside productivity rt and
normalized by the standard deviation of bt per unit of time. Hence, we refer
to Ωt as the normalized surplus of a job. The distribution of job tenures is
the "First Passage time" distribution (e.g. Cox and Miller, 1965), i.e. the
distribution of durations till the random walk Ωt passes the single absorbing
barrier Ωt =0for the ﬁrst time. The density function of Ωt conditional on
1We use:
Jp =e x p ( rt)j0,J pp =e x p( rt)j00
Jr =e x p ( rt)

j − j0
,J rr =e x p( rt)

j − 2j0 + j00
Jpr =e x p ( rt)

j0 − j00










where φ(·) is the standard normal density. However, a realization of Ωt is not
interesting if separation has occurred before time t. This situation cannot cor-
respond to a job-worker match since separation decisions are irreversible. We
are thus interested in the density of Ωt conditional on the fact that no sepa-
ration has occurred before time t,t h a ti sΩs > 0 for all 0 ≤ s<t .A s i m p l e
methodology can be applied in this regard, often used in pricing barrier options
in mathematical ﬁnance, the stochastic reﬂection principle: there is a one-to-
one correspondence between trajectories from Ω to Ωt having crossed Ωs =0
at least once, and trajectories from −Ω to Ωt. This latter group of trajec-
tories should thus be subtracted from the trajectories from Ω to Ωt for the
calculation of the density of all trajectories from Ω to Ωt that never crossed
Ωs =0 .L e tg(ω,t,Ω) be the joint density/probability of Ωt = ω and T>t ,s o
g(ω,t,Ω) ≡ Pr(Ωt = ω∧T>t |Ω) (we add the parameter Ω as an argument for



















where the factor e−2Ωπ corrects for the diﬀerential eﬀect of the drift on the
density for upward and downward trajectories. The cumulative distribution of
jobs surviving at time t, 1−F (t,Ω), is calculated by integrating g(ω,t,Ω) over
Ωt ∈ [0,∞):
















where Φ(.) is the standard normal CDF. The distribution of completed job
tenures is therefore fully speciﬁed by two parameters, the distance from the
separation threshold at job separation Ω and the drift π. The corresponding
























The job exit rate is then given by f(t,Ω)/[1−F(t,Ω)]. It is straightforward
to check that the exit rate is hump shaped, starting from 0, reaching a peak at t∗,
0 <t ∗ < 2/3Ω2, and afterwards either declining monotonically to 0 for positive
drift π>0 or to 1/2π2 for negative drift π<0. Farber (1994), Teulings and
Van der Ende (2000) and Horowitz and Lee (2002) have documented this hump
shaped pattern using NLSY data. A positive drift implies a non exhaustive








surplus : 0.32 , drift : 0.15
surplus : 0.30 , drift : 0.23
Figure 1: Predicted Job Hazards
behavior, where some jobs never end. The fraction of surviving job spells for
π>0 is given by the survivor function (7) when t →∞ , hence by 1 − e−2Ωπ.
We plot the exit rates for pairs Ω =0 .32 and π =0 .15 and respectively Ω =0 .30
and π =0 .23 (these are mean values for Ω and π from our estimations of the
tenure distribution parameters, see Section 3 below) in Figure 1. In both cases
the peak is reached at t ' 0.04 years. Since π>0, the hazard rate converges
to zero and a positive fraction of the jobs will never end. For mean values
of parameters of Ω =0 .32 and π =0 .15 about 10 % of the jobs never end.
We conclude that the parameters Ω and π can be identiﬁed from data on the
distribution of job tenures, but the parameter σ cannot.
2.3 Tenure Proﬁle in Wages
2.3.1 Sharing Rule of Surpluses
We now extend the model with an explicit sharing rule of surpluses during the
course of the job spell. We use a rule stipulating that the surplus bt − bs is
shared in ﬁxed proportions between the worker and the ﬁrm.2 The worker’s log
wage wt then satisﬁes:
wt = rt + bs + β (bt − bs)=rt + bs + σΩt (9)
2This approach is more pragmatic than what is commonly used in the literature, where the
wage setting is done by Nash bargaining leading to a sharing rule of the return on the expected
discounted value of all future absolute surpluses, instead of the instantaneous relative surplus.
One can view our approach as a ﬁrst order expansion of this rule.
10where σ ≡ βσ. We interpret β as the worker’s bargaining power. Equation (9)
implies eﬃcient separation, since at the moment of separation t = T, bT = bs,
and hence, wT = rT + bs.S i n c ebs = pT − rT, this implies wT = pT: log wages
are equal to log inside productivity. For a slightly lower pt, wt >p t,a n dﬁrms
would prefer separation above continuation of the employment relation. Log
wages within a job follow a Brownian with drift µr + σπ.T h et e r mσπ is the
tenure proﬁle. At the start of each job, t =0and Ωt = Ω. After job start,
Ωt goes up in expectation with π every period, conditional on the fact that Ωt
remains positive. Were job separations independent of the realization of Ωt (and
of rt), we would have:
E(wt|t<T )=E(rt)+bs + σπt
In that case, the tenure proﬁle would be estimated easily, for instance in dis-
crete time by ﬁrst diﬀerencing the equation above and then comparing log wage
growth for job stayers and job changers:
stayers : ∆E(wt|1 <t<T)=µr + σπ
changers : ∆E(w∗
t|t = T)=µr − σπ(T − 1)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator and where the superscript ∗ indicates
that we compare log wages in the new and the old job; hence, ∆w∗
T compares
the starting wage in the new job to the wage one year before separation in the
old job.
However, in completed job spells Ωt is correlated to T for three reasons:
(i) Ω0 = Ω, (ii) ΩT =0 , and (iii) Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<T . Empirically, rt is
only observed at the beginning of a job: r0 = w0 − bs − σΩ, and at the end
of a job: rT = wT − bs. In between, the researcher has no information on rt,
but only on wt. Our strategy is to calculate E(Ωt) conditional on the three
pieces of information available, (i), (ii), and (iii), and to enter this expectation
as a regressor in a regression of within job log wage growth. Mutatis mutandis
the same applies to job spells that do not end before the end of the time span
covered by the data, the incomplete job spells. Let L be the the last date on
which data are available. What we know about an incomplete job spell that
it is still running at L. Hence, there are again three pieces of information: (i)
Ω0 = Ω, (ii) T>L>t, and hence (iii) Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<L . And again we
calculate the conditional expectation E(Ωt). Below we discuss the conditional
expectation ﬁrst for completed and then for incomplete job spells.
2.3.2 Conditional Expectation of Ωt for Completed Spells
Let h(ω,t,τ) be the density of Ωt = ω conditional on (i) Ω0 = Ω, (ii) Ωτ =0 ,
and (iii) Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<τ . Comparing this density to g(ω,t,Ω),t h e r e
is one additional condition: Ωτ =0 ,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,T = τ.W h e n w e w a n t
to apply Bayes’s rule, we need the distribution of T conditional on Ωt = ω.
Since Ωt is a martingale, the distribution of T conditional on Ωt = ω is equal
to the distribution of T = τ − t conditional on Ω = ω. Hence, its density is
11f (τ − t,ω), see equation (8). Then h(ω,t,τ) can be calculated from f (·) and




0 f(τ − t,x)g(x,t,Ω)dx
(10)
The conditional expectation reads:























where τ denotes the realization of T. The derivation is discussed in Appendix
A1. The remarkable feature of this expression is that it does not depend on the
tenure proﬁle in wages, π. Hence, conditional on the model that we speciﬁed,
the evolution of wages in completed job spells does not provide any information
at all on the tenure proﬁle in wages. Given the many papers that have tried to
do so, this is a staggering conclusion.
E(Ωt|0 <t<T= τ) satisﬁes the following conditions:
lim
t−>0
E(Ωt|0 <t < T = τ)=Ω
lim
t−>T


















The full expression of derivatives as a function of t can be found in the Appendix
A1. The ﬁrst two lines above ﬁt our assumptions that a job starts at Ω0 = Ω and
ends at ΩT =0 . The third line says that the initial slope is negative for short
spells, T<Ω2, and positive for longer spells. For short spells, the expected sur-
plus must decline immediately to reach ΩT =0in time. Therefore these spells
are a selective sample of trajectories for which the expected surplus declines
right from the start of the job spell. Correspondingly, the long spells T>Ω2
are the selective sample for which the opposite holds. The fourth line shows
that the expected surplus declines inﬁnitely fast just before separation. Tra-
jectories that separate the next minute are therefore a highly selective sample.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence by Jacobson, LaLonde and
Sullivan (1993) on the decline in the wage proﬁle in the period just before the
moment of separation. The ﬁnal line above shows that the second derivative is














Figure 2: Expected Surplus in Completed Job Spells
always negative. Hence, the expected surplus is concave in t; it is monotonically
decreasing for short spells T<Ω2 and it is hump shaped for longer spells. The
tenure proﬁle is plotted for the estimated mean value Ω =0 .32 and for various
values of T in Figure 2. For T ≤ 0.1 years the tenure proﬁle is monotonically
decreasing, while for larger T it is increasingly concave. The top of the proﬁle is
increasing in T, showing the importance of conditioning on the eventual tenure.
2.3.3 Conditional Expectation of Ωt for Incomplete Spells
The conditional expectation for incomplete job spells, E(Ωt|t<L<T ),i s
calculated by using the same methodology as in the case of the completed job
spells. Let h∗(ω,t,L) be the density of Ωt = ω conditional on (i) Ω0 = Ω, (ii)
Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<L ,a n d( i i i )T>L . The application of the Bayes rule leads
to the following expression for the conditional density:
h∗(ω,t,L)=
[1 − F(L − t,ω)]g(ω,t,Ω)
R ∞
0 [1 − F(L − t,x)]g(x,t,Ω)dx
(12)
This density can by used for the calculation of the conditional expectation in
the same way as equation (11). Contrary to the case of completed spells, there
is however no explicit expression for the conditional expectation in this case,
cf. Appendix A2 for the ﬁnal expressions on which numerical integration is
performed. Figure 3 presents the trajectory of E(Ωt|t<L<T ) for Ω =
0.32,π =0 .15 and L =1 ,3,5,10. The higher L, the more information on T is
available, since T>L .











Figure 3: Expected Surplus in Incomplete Job Spells
E(Ωt|t<L<T) for a ﬁxed t is increasing in L. The reason is that higher
values of L imply a greater selectivity, since more and more trajectories leading
to a separation have been selected out. Were there no selectivity, then the
trajectory would be linear, E(Ωt|t<L<T)= E(Ωt)=πt. The trajectories are
strongly concave, implying that selection plays an important role. Contrary to
the completed spells case, incomplete spells do provide information on the drift
π. Nevertheless the impact of the drift is negligible compared to selectivity,
as documented by Figure 4, which compares the trajectories of the conditional
expectation in completed spells, in incomplete spells and in absence of any
selectivity. The concavity outweighs the linear trajectory by far, at least for the
ﬁrst ﬁve years.
We also plot conditional expectations of the surplus for mean values of the
tenure distribution parameters in both completed and incomplete job spells, for
very long job durations. Trajectories of the expected surplus for T =1 0 ,20 and
respectively L =1 0 ,20 are plotted in Figure 5. One notices that the diﬀerence
between the expected surplus in completed job spells and incomplete job spells
increases with the time span. At the same time the strong concavity due to
selection is clearly visible in both cases.
2.3.4 Expected Within-Job and Between-Job Wage Growth
We can apply the conditional expectations of Ωt in incomplete and completed
job spells for the analysis of the expected wage growth ∆wt within a job and re-
spectively ∆w∗
T between jobs. For this purpose, we decompose the random
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Figure 4: Selectivity versus Drift in the Expected Surplus














Figure 5: Expected Surplus in Long Spells
15variables [∆pt,∆rt] in two orthogonal components ∆bt and ∆zt, such that
Cor(∆bt,∆zt)=0 . Given the previous assumptions on the joint normality
of ∆pt and ∆rt, such a decomposition is always feasible. Hence, for 1 <t<T,
∆rt = ∆zt − γβ∆bt = ∆zt − γσ∆Ωt (13)
∆wt = ∆zt +( 1− γ)β∆bt = ∆zt +( 1− γ)σ∆Ωt





and Cov(∆zt,∆bt)=0 . Obviously, the parameter γ can
be expressed in terms of the covariance matrix Σ and the bargaining power β,
but that is of little help here. It is more useful to interpret it as a reﬂection
of the correlation between the match surplus and the reservation wage. In the
one extreme case γ =0 ,w ec a nw r i t e∆pt = ∆rt + ∆bt, with both right-
hand side variables being uncorrelated. Then ∆rt reﬂects the evolution of the
general human capital of the worker in this job as well as in all other jobs,
which evolves independently of the value of the speciﬁc capital in the present
job, ∆bt. Hence, the duration of the actual job is fully determined by its own
(mis)fortune. Though the distinction between quits and layoﬀs makes little
sense in this model, separations look like layoﬀsi nt h i sc a s e :t h eﬁrm ﬁres the
worker since she is no longer productive. In the opposite extreme case γ =1 ,
we can write ∆rt = ∆pt −∆bt, again with both right-hand side variables being
uncorrelated. Now, ∆pt reﬂects the evolution of the general human capital
of the worker in this job as well as in all other jobs; ∆bt reﬂects the speciﬁc
evolution of outside opportunities, e.g. new technologies emerging in other ﬁrms.
Separations look like quits in this case: the worker quits because she can get a
better job elsewhere. We can use equation (13) to specify four OLS regressions,
which are discussed below.
Taking expectations in the second equation of (13) yields:
E(∆wt|1 <t < T = τ)=µz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|1 <t<T= τ) (14)
E(∆wt|1 <t < L < T )=µz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|1 <t<L<T)
Var (∆wt|t<T) ≡ σ2
w
The ﬁrst equation from (14) applies for completed spells, where we observe T =
τ; the second equation applies for incomplete spells, where we only know that
the job ends beyond the period covered by the data, T>L .S i n c es e p a r a t i o n
decisions are fully determined by the evolution of bt (or, equivalently, Ωt)a n d
since ∆bt and ∆zt are uncorrelated, there is no selectivity in ∆zt. Hence,
the conditioning 1 <t<L<Tcan be omitted in E(∆zt). As discussed
before, Ω and π can be estimated from the distribution of observed job spells.
These parameters are suﬃcient statistics for the calculation of the conditional
expectations of ∆Ωt. These expectations can be used as explanatory variables
in a regression of within job log wage growth, ∆wt.3 These equations identify
(1 − γ)σ,b u tn o tγ and σ separately. Hence, we can only infer the part of the
tenure proﬁle that is associated with the selectivity in wt,n o ti nrt.
3There is an alternative estimation strategy for within job log wage changes for completed
spells. We observe rt at the beginning and at the end of the job spell: r0 = w0 − bs − σΩ
and rT = w∗
0 − bs −σΩ,w h e r ew∗
0 is the starting wage in the new job and Ω is kept constant
16For job changers, we can write a similar equation:
E(∆w∗
t|t = T)=µz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|t = T)+σΩ∗ (15)
The term E(∆Ωt|t = T) reﬂects the wage decline in the old job the year before
separation.4 It is always negative, see Figure 2. The term Ω∗ reﬂects the
wage increase due to entering the new job, where the log productivity pt is
again substantially above the log reservation wage rt. Equation (15) allows the
separate identiﬁcation of γ and σ,b yt h eﬁnal term, the upward jump in wages
as a return to the speciﬁc investment in the new job, σΩ∗. Hence, we are able
to identify γ, and hence the selectivity in rt, only by comparing the concavity
of the tenure proﬁle within job spells to the jump in wages when changing jobs.
Otherwise, the data do not provide another way to estimate this part of the
selectivity.














The ﬁrst equation above follows immediately from the second equation of (13),
since ΩT =0 .T h eﬁrst term reﬂects the general drift in log wages. Though till
sofar the value of Ω was held constant across jobs, so that the second term drops
out since the diﬀerence between the value of Ω for subsequent jobs vanishes,
Ω∗ − Ω =0 , we retained this term for future reference. The second equation
in (16) follows from the second equation of (13), using the orthogonality of
∆zt and (1−γ)β∆bt and Var[(1 − γ)β∆bt]=( 1− γ)
2 σ2. The relation between
the regression coeﬃcients on E(∆Ωt|.) in equations (14) and (15) on the one
hand, and the variances of ∆wt and w∗
0 − w0 on the other hand, provides a
strong test for the model:







0 − w0) (17)
across jobs. We can add these conditions to our regression analysis. Hence:







Then, taking ﬁrst diﬀerences and expectations in equation (9) yields:




+ σE (∆Ωt|1 <t<T)
We do not use this methodology here since it can only be applied to completed job spells,
which, moreover, start within the observation period of the data (for otherwise, we do not
observe w0). This is a small subset of the total number of job spells.
4Implicitly, we assume here that separation takes place exactly at the end of the year of
observation. Taking the model literally, this is an important assumption, since wages decline
steeply in the last year before separation, see Figure 2. If separation occurs earlier on during
the year of observation, part of the fall in wages during the last year before separation is
captured by the previous observation. In the empirical section we also use the "full fall" in
wages.
17This test relates the observed variance of wage changes within job spells, net of
the variance of the overall shock z, to the degree of concavity in wages. If the
model survives this test, it shows that the concavity in the tenure proﬁle can be
fully explained by selectivity.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 The Data
We use a dataset based on a PSID extract of 18 waves, covering the years 1975
through 1992, same as the one used by Altonji and Williams (1997, 1999). Our
model does not work very well when employed people consider other alternatives
than switching to another job, like retirement, leaving the labor force or taking
up full time education. The availability of these other alternatives yields two
problems. First, we do not observe the reservation wage at the point of separa-
tion when people do not accept another job. Second, with only one alternative
to the present job, the decision problem is simply whether a particular indicator
switches signs. With more alternatives, that choice process becomes far more
complicated. Therefore we restrict the sample to people who do not switch in
and out the labor force regularly and for whom retirement is not a relevant
option: white male heads of household with more than 12 years of education
and less than 60 years of age. Our reasoning is similar to the one used in Mincer
and Jovanovic (1981), who also use job separation synonymous to job change,
thereby also deﬁning labor mobility as change of employer and excluding other
alternatives, which is a minor phenomenon for the full-time male working force.
Furthermore, we restrict the attention to those individuals that were employed,
temporarily laid oﬀ, or unemployed at the time of the survey, and were not from
Alaska or Hawaii. We use the tenure and experience measures constructed with
the algorithm described by Altonji and Williams (1999 and previous working
versions). Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables of interest. There
are missing values for all variables. Most missing values are reported for the log
wage variable. However, we do not need this variable in the tenure distribution
analysis and thus we include also the observations for which the log wage is not
reported. One can distinguish four types of job spells. Apart from the distinc-
tion between completed and incomplete spells (right censoring), one can also
make a distinction between spells that start before the time span covered by the
data, and spells that start afterwards (left censoring). The table provides the
number of spells of each of these four types. There is, however, a fundamental
diﬀerence between these types of censoring. While right censoring implies that
we do not know when a job spell has ended, left censoring does not imply that
we do not know when a job has started because at the start of the observation
period workers are asked for how long they hold their present job.
18Table 1: Summary Statistics Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
logwage(1) 2.44 0.49 0.06 4.82 18151
tenure (years) 7.45 7.88 0.08 43.69 20175
experience (years) 15.07 9.4 0.08 43.69 21099
year of observation 84.01 5.06 75 92 21099
job per individual 1.85 1.42 1 14 21099
age 34.56 9.68 18 60 21099
education (years) 13.69 1.77 12 17 20857
metropolis 0.61 0.49 0 1 21099
union member 0.21 0.41 0 1 20725
married 0.85 0.36 0 1 21099
Dataset for Estimating the Tenure Distribution Parameters
Number observations discarded from AW (1997) 5431
Number of individuals 2837
Total number job spells 5484
- started before the observed range 1924
- started within the observed range 3560
Completed job spells 1911
- started before the observed range 434
- started within the observed range 1477
Incomplete job spells 3573
(1)reported average hourly wage deﬂated using the implicit price deﬂator with 1982 base year
3.2 Test of the Random Walk Hypothesis
To prepare the ground for our formal analysis we document some stylized facts
on wages. In particular, we verify that log wages follow a random walk, as
assumed in our theoretical modelling. For this purpose we repeat the analysis
of wage dynamics by MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and
Ward (1992). In the process of this analysis we document some further stylized
facts that are useful in the subsequent analysis. First, we run a regression of
within-job log wage diﬀerentials on a number of controls. Next, we construct a
covariogram of residuals from this regression, from which we infer the process
driving the wage dynamics. Finally, we show that the variance of the innovations
in wages does not depend on experience and tenure.
Consider the following model with a very simple tenure proﬁle:
wit = α + β1Eijt + β2E2
ijt + γ1Tijt + γ2T2
ijt + ηi + vj + uit (18)
where j (i,t) is the job j where worker i is employed at time t (we leave out the
arguments of j (·) for convenience); ηi is a random individual eﬀect (e.g. ability),
vj is a random job eﬀect, and uit is a time-varying stochastic component of
wages. E stands for labor market experience and T for job tenure. For the sake
of the argument, let us assume that Tijt is orthogonal to uit.F i r s t - d i ﬀerencing
equation (18) for job stayers yields:
∆wit =( β1 + γ1)+β2∆E2
it + γ2∆T2
ijt + ∆uit (19)
Since Eit and Tijt increase at the same pace within jobs, we are not able
19to identify β1 and γ1 separately. This is one of the main problems in the
identiﬁcation of the tenure proﬁle in wages: only workers who switch jobs allow
us to distinguish β1 and γ1.H o w e v e r ,β1 + γ1 is estimated consistently in an
OLS regression. We allow β1+γ1 to vary by education level, for union members,
for married people and for people living in a metropolitan area. Furthermore,
we add a full set of year dummies to account for general variation in real wage
growth and inﬂation, so that we do not obtain a single estimate for β1 + γ1.
First-diﬀerencing for job movers yields:
∆w∗







where the superﬁx ∗ indicates that a job change has taken place and where Tijt
is the tenure in the old job. In this simple model, we can estimate the ﬁrst order
eﬀect of the tenure proﬁle by the eﬀect of tenure on the change in wages for job
movers. The regression results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Within and Between-Jobs Wage Change Regressions
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Intercept 0.055∗∗ (0.016) -0.058 (0.091)
∆Tenureijt -0.001 (0.009)
∆Tenure2
ijt -8e-4∗ (4e-4) 7e-4 (0.001)
∆Tenure3
ijt e-5† (8e-6) -e-5 (2e-5)
∆Experience2
it -0.002∗∗ (4e-4) -0.003 (0.002)
∆Experience3
it 2e-5∗∗ (7e-6) 3e-5 (4e-5)
Educationijt 9e-4 (9e-4) 0.008 (0.006)
Metropolisijt 0.007∗ (0.003) -0.011 (0.020)
Union memberijt 0.001 (0.004) -0.133∗∗ (0.030)





(16):1 4 4 . 9 6 ∗∗ χ2
(13):2 0 . 0 2 †
Wald joint(3) χ2
(24) :2 6 4 . 7 2 ∗∗ χ2
(22):5 7 . 8 6 ∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
T h er e g r e s s i o n si n c l u d et i m ee ﬀects
(1) SER= standard error of the regression (root mean square error)
(2) Wald test for joint signiﬁcance of time dummy coeﬃcients
(3) Wald test for joint signiﬁcance of all covariates
We run separate regressions for job stayers and changers. In the regression
for stayers, we ﬁnd evidence for concavity in the tenure and experience pro-
ﬁles, though the higher order terms of the tenure proﬁle are smaller and less
signiﬁcant than those for the experience proﬁle. Other variables do not mat-
ter, except for living in a metropolitan area, which positively inﬂuences wage
growth. The results for job movers do not ﬁt the simplest theory of a deter-
20ministic tenure proﬁle that is unrelated to uit,s i n c et h ec o e ﬃcients γ1 and γ2
are both insigniﬁcant. The only factor that matters is union membership. This
result is consistent with the right to manage model of the union, see for example
MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), where unions negotiate wages above the going
market rate, but where ﬁrms decide on employment. Moreover, the result is
also consistent with some versions of the eﬃcient bargaining model, where the
union forces the ﬁrm to retain workers even when their wage is above marginal
productivity. It is inconsistent with Nash bargaining at an individual level.
Table 3: Residual Autocovariances for Within-Job Wage Innovations
Lag Autocovariance Autocorrelation Sig. Level Obs.
0 .03213 1 0 11834
1 -.01056 -.35175 0 8992
2 -.00098 -.03342 .004 7385
3 .00072 .02484 .049 6293
4 .00025 .00866 .525 5381
5 -.00048 -.01781 .227 4590
6 -.00024 -.00913 .570 3875
7 -.00042 -.01657 .346 3238
8 .00015 .00591 .759 2691
9 -.00024 -.00917 .666 2209
10 .00066 .02358 .323 1755
11 -.00036 -.01402 .604 1370
12 .00007 .00323 .917 1034
13 .00061 .02944 .422 746
14 -.00061 -.02618 .553 516
15 -.00087 -.04970 .399 289
16 .00054 .04069 .681 104
Table 3 presents the covariogram of the residuals of the within-job wage
change regression. Residuals are strongly negatively correlated to their ﬁrst lag,
while autocorrelations for longer lags are small and statistically insigniﬁcant be-
yond lag 3. Lag 1 and 2 are strongly signiﬁcant, lag 3 is only marginally signiﬁ-
cant at 5%. This outcome is very similar to results obtained by MaCurdy(1982),
Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward (1992). Our covariogram is thus
typical of an MA(2) process or even an MA(1) once we note that the second
order lag autocovariance is close to 0.5 For simplicity, we focus on the MA(1)
case.
We decompose the stochastic time-variant component of the wage equation
from (18) in a martingale persistent component eit and a transitory component
5We also considered the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for the lagged residuals.
The PACF values, lag 1 to 16, are the following, with starred values statistiﬁcally signiﬁcant
at 10% or better: −0.35∗∗∗, −0.20∗∗∗, −0.07∗∗∗, −0.04∗∗∗, −0.02, −0.015, −0.04∗∗, −0.011,
−0.03, 0.03, 0.008, 0.02, 0.06, −0.06, −0.08, 0.29∗. Hence, the PACF pattern further supports
the pure MA speciﬁcation versus a mixed ARMA type process.
21ηit:
uit = eit + ηit (21)
∆eit = εit
where ηit and εit are i.i.d. with Var(ηit)=σ2
η and Var(εit)=σ2








This is a reasonable description of the pattern of autocorrelations in the covar-
iogram in Table 2. A back-of-the-envelope calculation yields σ2
w =0 .022 and
σ2
η =0 .005. Our result for the variance of persistent income shocks is similar
to that reported by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for the PSID6. Hence, a ran-
dom walk with transitory shocks provides a fairly accurate description of the
dynamics of log wages. The standard deviation of yearly permanent innovations
is substantial: 15% of the wage level per year. The transitory shocks ηit might
reﬂect measurement error.
Table 4 present results for the Koenker (1981) "Studentized LM" version
of the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for homoskedasticity of uit for both stayers
and movers: the squared residuals are regressed on a constant term and on all
control variables.
Table 4: BP Heteroskedasticity Test for Wage Changes Within and Between-
Jobs
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃc i e n t( S t d . E r r . )C o e ﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Intercept -0.018 (0.015) 0.114 (0.090)
∆Tenureijt -0.003 (0.009)
∆Tenure2
ijt -2e-4 (3e-4) 6e-4 (0.001)
∆Tenure3
ijt -3e-6 (7e-6) -2e-5 (3e-5)
∆Experience2
it e-4 (4e-4) 0.001 (0.002)
∆Experience3
it 2e-6 ( 6e-6) -2e-5 (4e-5)
Educationijt 0.003∗∗ (9e-4) -7e-4 (0.006)
Metropolisijt 0.004 (0.003) 0.018 (0.020)
Union memberijt -0.017∗∗ (0.004) 0.033 (0.030)






(13):1 6 . 9 0
Continued on next page...
6For their whole PSID sample of males heads of household, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
obtain 0.031 as variance of the permanent income shocks. For highschool graduates without
college degree (the largest part of individuals in our PSID extract) they report an even closer
result to ours, 0.027.
22... table 4 continued
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃc i e n t( S t d . E r r . )C o e ﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Wald joint χ2
(24): 89.28∗∗ χ2
(22):2 1 . 3 4
Breusch-Pagan(1) χ2
(24):N * R 2=87.57∗∗ χ2
(22:N * R 2=21.43
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
The regressions include time eﬀects
The dependent variable is the square residual from Table 2.
We use Koenker’s (1981) modiﬁed version of the Breusch-Pagan test
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected for stayers, but only be-
cause of education and union membership. The evolution of wages in unionized
jobs is largely governed by predetermined wage scales, explaining the low vari-
ance of wage changes. The higher variance for better educated workers squares
with the conclusions from studies analyzing risk in educational choice and is
conﬁrmed also by other empirical applications on the PSID. In the regression
for job movers homoskedasticity is not rejected. However, the variance in wages
for movers is much higher than for stayers, so there is clearly heteroskedasticity
between movers and stayers. At ﬁrst sight this result is hard to square with our
theoretical framework, where wages follow a random walk and where there is
a perfect frictionless market for alternative job opportunities. However, essen-
tial for our purpose is that there is no heteroskedasticity with respect to either
job tenure or experience. For example, a simple learning model would imply a
higher variance early on in the career, when people still have to learn their capa-
bilities and comparative advantages before ﬁnding their optimal profession, see
Jovanovic (1979) and Topel and Ward (1992). The results reported in Table 4
do not conﬁrm this idea. Instead they provide support for the ideas put forward
in Section 2, where wt is assumed to follow a random walk. When we assume
that workers are able to disentangle permanent and transitory shocks (which
is certainly true if the transitory component ηit reﬂects measurement error or
variation in hours worked), then the transitory shock will not have an eﬀect on
job changes because changing jobs permanently is not a useful response to a
shock that has only a transitory eﬀect: as soon as you have changed jobs, the
cause for changing has faded away. Hence, we feel safe to ignore the eﬀect of
transitory shocks of job relocation in the subsequent analysis.
Our preparatory ground work provides support for the main ingredient of
our model, wages following a random walk, where neither the variance of the
innovations nor the wage loss of moving to another jobs depend on tenure and
experience. There are two aspects which do not ﬁt our theoretical framework
well: (i) the larger wage loss for union members upon job change, which seems
to be prima facie evidence against Nash bargaining for unionized ﬁrms, and
(ii) the larger variance of wages upon job change, which suggests that there are
substantial search frictions on the market for alternative job opportunities.
233.3 The Parameters of the Tenure Distribution
The parameters of the tenure distribution for the surplus Ω and the drift π can
be estimated by maximum likelihood, using the density function (8). Till sofar,
we have treated both parameters as constants which do not depend on worker
characteristics. However, one can expect that workers choose their optimal
job type according to their characteristics. Hence, Ω and π are likely to diﬀer
according to both observed and unobserved worker characteristics. Since we deal
with longitudinal data we can take into account random worker eﬀects. We do
not consider random job eﬀects for both theoretical and empirical reasons. From
a theoretical point of view, our assumption of a frictionless market for alternative
job opportunities, where the only constraint on instantaneous mobility is the
speciﬁc investment in the present job and not the cost of getting another job
oﬀer, each worker type will choose that job type that ﬁts best her comparative
advantages, like in Sherwin Rosen’s famous hedonic world of kissing curves.
Hence, job characteristics are implied by worker characteristics. The only job
characteristic that we allow for is union membership. From an empirical point
of view, we observe each job only once, so that we have no basis for identifying
random job eﬀects other than from functional form assumptions. Taking into
account that Ω has to be positive, the following speciﬁcation for Ω and π is
adequate:








where uΩi and uπi are normally distributed random worker eﬀects with mean 0
and standard deviations σΩ and σπ,a n dw h e r exij is a vector of observed worker
characteristics, i.e. education, experience at the start of the job spell, a dummy
for union membership, a dummy for living in a metropolitan city and a dummy
for being married7. We take all covariates (including the dummy variables) in
deviations from their means over jobs. Hence, the intercept can be interpreted
as the mean value for Ω and π respectively. We assume both random eﬀects to



















where j (i) is the jth job held by worker i (we leave out the argument i of j (i)
for the sake of convenience), where dij is a dummy variable, taking the value
dij =1if the job spell is completed and the value dij =0otherwise, where Tij
is the completed tenure if dij =1and respectively the tenure at time L,t h el a s t
7It is very cumbersome and it would be loosely approximated if we were to construct prior
mobility measures for all workers in the PSID and include them as covariates, as for instance
in Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) or Farber (1994). Although prior mobility is often found to
increase the probability of separation, whether this is due to unobserved characteristics of the
workers or it has a direct eﬀect on current tenure is unclear; including random worker eﬀects
we should be able to control for most unobserved worker characteristics.
24moment of observation in the panel, otherwise, and where N is the number of
individuals and Ji is the number of jobs for individual i.
T h e r ea r et w or e a s o n sw h yw eh a v et om a k ea m e n d m e n t st ot h es i m p l el i k e -
lihood function in equation (23). First, we could restrict the estimation to job
spells that have started within the observation range of our PSID extract. How-
ever this means that we do not consider jobs starting before the beginning of the
observation period. By construction, this would limit the maximum completed
tenure in the data to the maximum time span covered by the PSID sample, that
is 17 years. Since long tenures contain relevant information, we want to include
spells starting before the ﬁrst observation period of the PSID. We know all xij’s
for these spells since there are neither dummy indicator changes, nor education
changes during the course of a job and since we can compute experience at the
beginning of a job by subtracting current tenure from current experience. How-
ever, we observe these spells only conditional on the fact that they have lasted
till the start of our observation period. We should correct the log likelihood

















where tij is the tenure of individual i in job j at the start of the PSID. Note that
for spells started after the start of the PSID, tij =0 ,s oF (tij)=0 ,m e a n i n g
that we are back in the simple case from (23).
Second, since the PSID collects data at a yearly interval, job spells completed
in less than a year are underreported. We know the elapsed tenure in months
at the ﬁrst moment a job spell is observed, by a retrospective question8, but
we do not know whether there has been another job spell between the job
observed a year ago and the job observed now. Since the hazard rate implied
by our model is hump shaped, with the hump likely to be within the ﬁrst year,
cf. Farber (1994), this phenomenon is expected to have a large impact on the
estimation results. We are likely to overestimate Ω and π,s i n c ew em i s sp a r t
of the short tenures in our data. Hence, we have to correct for this form of
left censoring. One solution to this problem is to use a similar conditioning as
in equation (24), where tij is the initial tenure in months as measured at the
ﬁrst observation after the start of the spell. However, this approach does not
use the distribution of these tij’s itself9 We can use this distribution if we are
prepared to make the additional assumption that the starting date of job spells
is distributed uniformly over the ﬁrst year. Then, the density q (·) of initial
dates of spells that started throughout the year and are still incomplete at the
8Initial tenures are either reported or inferred by making them consistent with the latest
reported tenures- see appendix for more details on this process of constructing tenures in the
PSID
9Maximum likelihood estimation using this approach yields a huge hump in the hazard
rate, which implies a much higher share of spells shorter than a year that can be justiﬁed
from the distribution of tij for jobs started after the ﬁrst wave of the PSID.
25end of the year satisﬁes:
q (t)=
1 − F (t)
R 1
0 [1 − F (x)]dx
Then, the total contribution to the likelihood of a spell with initial tenure t and
completed tenure T reads:
f (T)




0 [1 − F (x)]dx


















The log likelihood that accounts both for jobs starting before the ﬁrst wave of
the PSID and for the left censoring for spells shorter than a year started after



















if spell starts after start PSID
R 1
0 [1 − F(x)]dx
if spell starts before start PSID 1 − F(tij)
We report results for (25), where we use only the jobs that start within the
observation period of the PSID, and for (26), where we use the sample including
job spells starting before the ﬁrst wave of the PSID10. The estimation results
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e5 .
Theoretically, the results for both likelihood functions should be identical.
Two observations are in place. First, though the two sets of estimation results
are statistically diﬀerent, the theoretical hazards for both models look very sim-
ilar (cf. Figure 1 above), the only diﬀerence being the height of the peak (lower
for the case where we use all job spells). The estimated intercepts of Ω and
respectively π are more or less identical (remember that all other xij are taken
in deviation from the mean, so that the intercept is something like the mean
value for Ω and π), but the coeﬃcients for other variables diﬀer substantially, in
particular those that are less precisely measured in the small sample. Second,
a number of results in Table 5 are consistent across both estimations. Spells
started at higher age and spells at unionized ﬁrms have a larger drift πij.W h e n
we include the spells started before the ﬁrst wave of the PSID, these variables
also have a positive eﬀect on the surplus Ωij.T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of experience
10In order to estimate the log-likelihood functions above, we used simulated maximum
likelihood, cf. Stern (1997). Sampling from a joint normal distribution with mean 0 and
variances σ2
π and σ2
Ω a n du s i n gas a m p l i n gs i z eo f500 sampling points (the results are robust to
altering the sampling dimension to any size between 100 and 500 sampling points) we achieved
strong convergence in a reasonable number of iterations. We used the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method for convergence of derivatives, allowing for a tolerance of
1E-4 times the absolute value of the log likelihood.
26would be consistent with the idea that workers start their career with some
initial job hopping, before settling down in a job that ﬁts one’s comparative
advantages best. For the positive eﬀect of union membership, economic theory
provides two explanations, one in which union membership causes a high Ωij
and one in which the causality runs the other way around. The ﬁrst argument
relies on a hold up problem. Unions extract part of the ﬁrm’s compensation for
the speciﬁc investment at job start. Firms respond by postponing job openings
till the surplus Ωij is so large that even their smaller share in it provides suf-
ﬁcient compensation for their investment. This type of argument is supported
by empirical ﬁndings in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) where if ﬁrms are
insulated from takeovers, wages rise, while the rates of destruction of old plants
and creation of new plants fall. The second argument relies on the idea that
the larger Ωij, the larger the workers’ incentives to get a proper share in it, and
hence the greater the payoﬀ of setting up a union. Our estimation results do
not allow distinguishing between these two scenarios. The second result that is
consistent between both set of estimation results is that the intercept for πij is
positive and large. In both cases, there are hardly observations for which πij is
negative. This implies that some job spells will last until the retirement of the
worker. The fraction of jobs that never end for mean values of the parameters is
about 10%, as calculated in Section 2. This observation will play an important
role in the rest of the analysis.
Table 5: MLE Tenure Distribution Parameters
Small Sample(1) Large Sample(2)
Variable Drift π Dist Ω Drift π Dist Ω
Intercept 0.228∗∗ -1.208 ∗∗ 0.158∗∗ -1.132∗∗
(st. errors) (0.021) (0.155) (0.0015) (0.014)
Education 0.017 0.040 -0.0005 -0.032∗∗
(st. errors) (0.012) (0.039) (0.0008) (0.007)
Initial experience 0.008∗∗ -0.009 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(st. errors) (0.002) (0.009) (0.0002) (0.001)
Union member 0.233∗∗ 0.271 0.138∗∗ 0.795∗∗
(st. errors) (0.056) (0.175) (0.003) (0.025)
Metropolis 0.015 0.070 0.009∗∗ -0.133∗∗
(st. errors) (0.043) (0.140) (0.002) (0.023)
Married 0.091† 0.121 -0.033∗∗ -0.012
(st. errors) (0.049) (0.162) (0.003) (0.030)
Random worker eﬀects σ 0.277∗∗ 0.0001 1.34e-8 1.75e-7
(st. errors) (0.050) (5.51) (0.001) (0.010)
Number Observations (job spells) 1911 5484
(1)Small sample= sample of job spells starting within the range of the PSID sample
(2)Big sample= sample of all job spells
All covariates are taken in deviations from their means over jobs
Standard errors in brackets under each coeﬃcient
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
One remarkable conclusion is that there are no unobserved worker eﬀects
when we use the sample including the spells started before the ﬁrst wave of
the PSID, while there is unobserved heterogeneity in the drift for the sample
without these spells. Since the long spells started before the ﬁrst wave contain
27crucial information, we focus on the estimation results obtained from the full
sample of job spells in what follows.
For future reference and as a test of the goodness of ﬁto ft h em o d e l ,w e
compute the density of incomplete job spells after a ﬁxed working experience, in
this case L =3 2years.11 Figure 6 depicts both the predicted and the empirical
density of incomplete job spells. There is a reasonable correspondence between
both densities. The peak in the ﬁrst year is overestimated, but otherwise the
shapes of the two densities are identical. Note the small peak in the density
for short incomplete spells, which is due to the hump shape pattern in the
hazard: if your job ends for instance in the last ﬁve years before the end of
the observation period, there is a substantial probability that you experience
further separations afterwards due to the peak in the hazard rate, leading to
a peak of short incomplete tenures. Close alignment of the predicted and the
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Figure 6: Density of Incomplete Job Spells with Exit Option
11This density is calculated by a recursive scheme. We divide the 32 years time period in
32 × 256 subperiods. We calculate the distribution of completed tenures for jobs starting at
the beginning of the career, in the ﬁrst subperiod. For some of these jobs, T>32,w h i c hi s
the density of incomplete tenures of 32 years. Then we calculate the distribution of completed
tenures for jobs starting in the second subperiod, which is the number of jobs started in
the ﬁrst subperiod that separate in the second. We add this number to the corresponding
completed tenures of the jobs started in the ﬁrst subperiod. Then we calculate the completed
tenure for jobs started in the third subperiod, etc. In these calculations we account for the
eﬀect of experience at the job start on the parameters Ω and π.
283.4 Wage Regressions
Table 6 presents estimation results on wage changes with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors12.
Table 6: Wage Changes in Completed Spells, Incomplete Spells and Job Transitions
1: Completed Spells 2: Incomplete Spells 3: Job Transition
Variable Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
A: Unrestricted Wage Changes Regression Estimates
Intercept 0.060∗∗ (0.015) 0.054∗∗ (0.010) 0.216∗ (0.102)
∆E(Ωijt) 0.008 (0.006) 0.039∗∗ (0.013) 0.137∗ (0.062)
Ωi,j+1,0 0.308∗ (0.145)
Expijt -0.004∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (9e-4) -0.007 (0.007)
Exp2
ijt 8e-5 (5e-5) 9e-5∗∗ (2e-5) 6e-5 (e-4)
Educijt 0.002 (0.002) e-4 (0.001) 0.031∗∗ (0.009)
Unionijt 0.006 (0.010) -0.004 (0.003) -0.163∗∗ (0.062)
Metropolisijt 0.007 (0.008) 0.011∗∗ (0.003) -0.017 (0.031)
Observations 2022 9653 618
SER 0.177 0.180 0.362





B: Restricted Wage Changes Regression Estimates
Intercept 0.049∗∗ (0.017) 0.147† (0.079)




Expijt -0.003† (0.002) -0.005 (0.007)
Exp2
ijt 6e-5 (5e-5) 7e-5 (e-4)
Educijt 0.002 (0.002) 0.030∗∗ (0.009)
Unionijt 0.007 (0.010) -0.161∗∗ (0.061)







C: General Wage Change Reg. for All Spells


















D: Initial Wage Changes Regression at Job Transitions(3)
1: Mean 2: Variance(4)
Variable Coef St Err Variable Coef St Err
Intercept Intercept 0.092∗∗ (0.024)
Teni,j−1,T 0.057∗∗ (0.011) Teni,j−1,T-1 0.019∗∗ (0.007)
∆Ωij0 0.075 (0.251)
Continued on next page...
12We tested for the absence of individual speciﬁce ﬀects. We left out being married as a
regressor since it was insigniﬁcant in all regressions.










(1):7 . 4 4 ∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † :1 0 % ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
(1) The +/- split of ∆E(Ωijt) is only relevant for completed spells
(2) In the general regression union and education are interacted with job change
(3) We only use completed jobs that last more than 1 year (Teni,j−1,T >1)






Panel (A) presents unrestricted regression results for job stayers, cf. equa-
tion (14), for completed spells in column 1 and for incomplete spells in column
2, and for job movers, cf. equation (15), in column 3. The theoretically relevant
regressors, ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) and Ωi,j+1, have the right sign. The other variables
tend to have limited eﬀect. However, the coeﬃcient on ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) should
be the same in all three regressions, namely (1 − γ)σ. Clearly, this prediction
is not conﬁrmed by the data. Panel (B) therefore considers a slightly amended
version of the model. Consider Figures 2 to 5 on the trajectories of E(Ωijt|T)
for completed spells. These trajectories are falling in the period just before
separation. Suppose that there is downward rigidity that prevents wages from
actually falling. This is consistent, for example, with the study by Beaudry
and DiNardo (1991), who show that within a job spell wages go up when un-
employment falls, but do not go down when unemployment rises. We could
test this idea in a crude way by separating the initial part of the job spell for
which the surplus is increasing, ∆E(Ωijt|T) > 0,a n dt h eﬁnal part for which the
surplus is decreasing, ∆E(Ωijt|T) > 0, and enter both as separate regressors.
The estimation results for this model are presented in column 1. The results
strongly conﬁrm our hypothesis: the upward part comes in with a coeﬃcient
which is very similar in size with the coeﬃcient for ∆E(Ωijt|T>L ),f r o mP a n e l
(A), column 2. Furthermore, if this downward rigidity model really applies,
one would expect that "missing wage declines" in the years before separation,
are actually compensated at the moment of separation, by an additional fall.
Hence, we include in the regression for job changers not the change in the sur-
plus during the year of separation, ∆E(Ωij,T−1), but the full decline, starting
from the maximum of E(Ωijt|T) during the job spell, till its minimum value at
the moment of separation, E(ΩijT)=0 . The results for this model are pre-
sented in column 3 of Panel B. The relevant coeﬃcient comes down from 0.137
to 0.075, a number that is close to the coeﬃcients found for the wage changes in
completed and incomplete spells. Both results provide support for our amended
model. Panel C combines the regressions for completed spells, incomplete spells
and job changers for this amended model, that is, column 2 of Panel A and
columns 1 and 3 of Panel B. We make one further amendment to the model,
by interacting union membership and education level with job change, so that
both variables aﬀect only the wage change for job movers. We weight the three
30samples by their respective standard errors of the regression (SER) obtained
in each of the three separate restricted regression models. The F(14,12270)
statistic of the restriction that the coeﬃcients of these 3 regressions are equal is
0.667, so that restrictions are accepted. Hence, the amended model provides a
good description of the data. The only exception are union members, who face
a 17 % additional wage loss upon separation. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect
of education on the wage change of movers is not predicted by the model (note
that education enters the regression via its eﬀect on Ωij,s e eT a b l e5 ) .
The estimation results from Panel C yield (1 − γ)σ =0 .041 and σ =0 .332,
implying γ =0 .877. This is a remarkable result. Apparently, separation is
not so much driven by shocks to the job’s productivity pt,a si ti sb ys h o c k s
to the worker’s reservation wage rt, which seems somewhat counter-intuitive.
Similarly, we can calculate the return to tenure, σπ =0 .332∗0.15 = 5% (taking
the estimated mean value of π). However, the high value of γ implies that most
of the return to tenure, more than 85%, takes the form of the log outside wage
rt falling, instead of the inside wage wt rising, cf. equation (13). Without this
selectivity part the tenure proﬁle is really small, (1−γ)σπ =0 .041∗0.15 = 0.6%.
Both estimates, that of γ and of the tenure proﬁle are fully driven by the estimate
of σ, which is driven by the eﬀect of Ωijt on the wage change for job movers,
see equation (15). This is a thin line of identiﬁcation. Although the part of the
tenure proﬁle due to selectivity is weakly identiﬁe d ,t h i si st h eﬁrst research to
actually account selectivity in the observed outside wages.
Equation (17) runs the test of comparing the concavity in the tenure proﬁle
to the variance in wage changes. Panel D of Table 6 presents estimation results
for equation (16). We restrict the sample to jobs lasting more than 1 year, since
wage changes for jobs that last only one year are noisy anyway13.C o l u m n 1
reports the coeﬃcients of the regression. Column 2 takes the squared residuals
from the ﬁrst regression, and regressest h e mo ne l a p s e dt e n u r e ,T.T h ei n t e r c e p t
captures the excess variance for job movers, see Table 4, and the transitory
shocks in wages, ηijt, see equation (21). The coeﬃcient for T is a consistent
estimator of 1
T Var(w∗
0 − w0). An estimator for σ2
w is derived from the regression
for within-job wage changes in Table 4, see Section 3.2. Hence:
(1 − γ)σ =
√
0.022 − 0.019 = 0.054
which is very similar to the estimated value in Panel C, 0.041. Thus the amended
model provides a good description of the data. The concavity of the tenure
proﬁle is fully captured by the term ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) and the size of its regression
coeﬃcient is consistent with the variance of yearly wage innovations and the
variance of initial wages over job spells.
A ﬁnal question we ask is to what extent the option to switch jobs limits
the growth of the variance in log wages over time. Without the option to
switch job, the variance of log wages would increase linearly over time, due to
the fact that zt and bt follow a random walk. However, the option to switch
13Using the whole sample, the coeﬃcient of T in the variance of wages regression is 0.010.
31jobs allows the worker to eliminate bad trajectories of bt, thereby compressing
its variance. This can be seen from the distribution of incomplete tenures,
see Figure 6, showing that a substantial fraction of the jobs has an incomplete
tenure of less than 32 years. There are two mechanisms that lead to compression.
First, many jobs have an incomplete tenure of less than 32 years and hence a
smaller variance, since the variance increases proportional to incomplete tenure.
Second, those jobs that are still going on after some period are a selective
sample of all the trajectories that have started initially, namely those which
never crossed the separation threshold. This selection process compresses the
variance. We use the density of incomplete tenures in Figure 6, and the density of
Ωt = bt/σ conditional on the incomplete tenure T, g(Ωt,t,Ω0)/[1 − F (t,Ω0)],
see equations (6) and (7). In Figure 7, we plot the evolution of the variance of bt
without the option to switch jobs, the line σ2T, and the evolution of the variance
with that option. The plots reveal that the option to switch jobs compresses
t h ev a r i a n c eo fbt considerably: by about 65% after 32 years of experience 14.
Note however that the variance of zt remains unaﬀected by this process, while

























0 10 20 30
experience
Var(wages) with Exit Option Var(wages) Random Walk
Conditional on Experience
Wage Variance Compression
Figure 7: Compression Eﬀect of the Exit Option on the Wage Variance
14We use σ =0 .041, our estimated coeﬃcient from Panel C. Hence, after 32 years of
experience, without the exit option the variance of bt would be 32 ∗ 0.412 =0 .054.W i t ht h e
option to exit the wage variance is compressed after the same period to about 0.019.
324C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Our simple model for the stochastic evolution of productivity explains the data
on the job tenure distribution and wages for the USA surprisingly well. This
model features frictionless labor market at the moment of job start (which en-
ables workers to pick the best job alternative straightaway), speciﬁc investment
and hence subsequent lock-in on the current job, and eﬃcient bargaining over
the match surplus. We have proven the remarkable result that in this model the
evolution of log wages in completed job spells does not provide any information
whatsoever on wage-tenure proﬁles, since this evolution is independent of the
drift in log wages. Hence, the tenure proﬁle can only be estimated either from
the distribution of tenure or from log wages in incomplete job spells. We have
veriﬁed that the wage dynamics within jobs closely resembles a random walk;
that the predicted job hazard rate is humped shaped with the peak very early in
time, closely tracing the empirical evidence on job exits; and that the variance
of the within-job wages does not diminish with tenure or experience, a fact that
is less easily squared with the learning model. We have further shown that the
concavity in the observed tenure proﬁle is easily explained by the selection of
the surviving employment matches, even when the underlying tenure proﬁle is
linear. In general, the selection eﬀect tends to be much more important than the
deterministic trend. This is in fact the ﬁrst research that looks at selectivity in
the observed outside productivities. Remarkably, job separation is driven more
by the selectivity in the outside productivity rt than by shocks to the inside
productivity in the job pt.M o r e t h a n 5/6 of our estimated tenure proﬁle is
accounted for by this selectivity in the outside option. However, identiﬁcation
of the part of the variance due to variation in rt is fragile, since we observe rt
only at the moment of job switching. We ﬁnd excess variance of wages at job
transition, indicating that our assumption of frictionless market for alternatives
is incorrect. Apparently, there is a great deal more randomness in the wage in
an e wj o bt h a ni st ob ee x p e c t e df r o mam o d e lw i t hf r i c t i o n l e s sm a r k e t .
Our model implies that, on average, wages should be falling relative to the
wages in other jobs in the second half of a completed spell. The data do not
support this prediction. Apparently, there is some downward rigidity in wages.
This is in particular true for unionized jobs, suggesting that there is ineﬃcient
separation in the unionized sector. Eﬃcient bargaining over the match surplus
is clearly rejected for unionized jobs. A slightly adjusted model, allowing for
downward rigidity in wages, can explain the data very well:
Ψt =m a x ( Ωt,Ψt−1)
wt = rt + σΨt
where job separation is still governed by the rule that a job ends at the ﬁrst
moment in time that Ωt reaches 0. Ψt is the maximum of its value in the previous
period and the current value of Ωt. Then, we would observe more wage rigidity
in job spells that are expected to end shortly (since there Ωt is declining), which
explains that ∆Ωt does not aﬀect ∆wt for ∆Ωt < 0. Hence, the standard error
33of ∆wt should be smaller in the period just before separation. This model needs
to be analyzed more formally, but the analysis presented here suggests that it
provides an adequate description of the data.
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A Computational Appendix
A.1 Completed job spells
The ﬁrst factor in the numerator of (10) is given by the equation of the density













The second part of the numerator in (10) was given in (6).






























Interestingly, this probability density does not depend at all on the drift
π. The drift aﬀects therefore the distribution of completed job tenures (see
expression 7 above), but not the distribution of Ωt conditional on the completed
tenure.
The expectation in (11) can now be calculated:































If we denote f (t) ≡ T−t
T in (29) above we obtain exactly (11).



















































A.2 Incomplete job spells
The ﬁrst factor in the numerator of (12) is given by substituting t with L and
Ω with ω in (7):
1 − F(L − t,ω) (32)
= Φ
µ










g(ω,t,Ω) was given in (6).
The complicated part in (12) resides in the integral from the denominator
of (12). The task would involve computing integrals of the form:
Z ∞
0
φ(ax + b)Φ(cx + d)dx (33)
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